The potentiality that the current government strategic petroleum reserves (GSPRs) can be improved by the pre-allocation of GSPR drawing rights has been neglected. This paper proposes to pre-allocate the GSPR drawing rights, and proves that by doing this the efficiency of GSPR and the society's incentive to finance GSPR can be improved. Particularly, the example demonstrates that the incentive improvement can be very significant. Since it takes huge expenditure on GSPR and it is very important to gain support from the consumers by improving GSPR, the proposal is quite worth considering.
Introduction
To prepare for oil supply interruption in advance, strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) [1] across the countries with high dependency on imported oil have been built. Almost 1/3 of SPRs are government owned stocks [2] , or what we call government strategic petroleum reserves (GSPRs). GSPR is vulnerable to criticisms and the society may have weak incentives to support it, because it is totally financed by public expenditure. The institution CATO published an analysis in 2005, arguing that the US SPR programs were inefficient since they have cost the US citizens too much but only generated a little benefit [3] . The criticisms on GSPRs motivated us to come up with a proposal for improving the GSPR. Based on strong assumptions, the proposal reserves a great possibility to improve the current GSPRs.
The assumptions and the proposal will be elaborated in Section 2. Section 3 shows that how the proposal is supposed to improve the current GSPR in terms of efficiency, and Section 4 proves that the proposal can increase the society's incentive to support GSPRs. The significance and limitedness of the proposal will be discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Assumptions and the Proposal

The Assumptions
SPRs generate two kinds of good. First, SPRs can keep oil price from soaring at supply interruption; second, SPR drawing rights enable the owners to be more competitive for the released SPR oil and thus give them advantages at supply interruption. The first good benefits all oil consumers and excludes none from enjoying it at bearable cost, so for it we have the name "public good", which is typically a kind of Samuelson's pure public goods [4] . The second good can easily exclude any one by price biding, so for it we have the name "private good".
Two , , , , , , G I M U U C t r  I is the number of the oil consumers, M is the size of the GSPR the government need build, 0 is the aggregate utility function of GSPR as pure public good while 1 is the aggregate utility function of the pre allocated GSPR drawing right, is the GSPR's total cost, is the anticipated duration between the time 0 and the next supply interruption, and is the real rate incorporating factors of the oil price's long run trend. The difference between the two governments is that under 0 GSPR is purely financed by public expenditure, while under 1 GSPR is financed not only by public expenditure but also by the private bids for the GSPR drawing rights before the construction of GSPR. For the governments, assumptions 1-3 are arranged. Assumption 3: As net oil importer, both 0 and 1 maximizes the aggregate consumer surplus, which means U and .
Consumers are willing to pay for GSPR because they have expected an oil supply interruption which may endanger their welfare and this danger may cost them more than GSPR does. As price takers under the current oil market condition, oil consumers know well that only collective actions can deter the soaring oil price. Economies of scale provide a main rationale for considering public infrastructure provision [5] . GSPR projects have extraordinary economies of scale, and the total GSPR cost would be unacceptably high if construction actions have been taken separately rather than collectively.
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stand for consumer i's utility function of GSPR as public good, and stand for consumer i's utility of his/her GSPR drawing right i , i stand for consumer i's payment for GSPR, i stand for i's proportional share of the total cost pie of the GSPR, and is concave and continuously increasing on ; , and .
It can be inferred that
is also continuously increasing on
However, there is free-riding problem in the provision of public good and it's rather difficult to overcome this problem by decentralized mechanisms, so for simplicity we assume that under the government' authority, the society's propensity to free-ride has been wiped out. Under this circumstance, the government can optimally decide the size of the GSPR as public good and the distribution of the corresponding cost. The rationale of the last sentence of assumption 6 is, if C is always larger than 0
GSPR should never be built; and, that U is always larger than is impossible.
We introduce the multiplier to further clarify the difference between the concepts of GSPR as public good and that of the GSPR drawing right. If there exists and only exists one so that the cost of the GSPR as public good is and that of the GSPR drawing right cost is
, the GSPR as public good and the GSPR drawing right are clearly separated. Under this circumstance, i becomes the coordinate of i's share of the public good cost and that of the drawing right cost, , subject to
Many examples, such as panic buying of fuel in 1973 oil crisis [6] , panic buying of fuel in Hurricane Katrina [7] , panic buying of salt in Japan' s nuclear crisis [8] and so on, suggest that consumer hoarding (or panic buying) may happen at supply interruption. According to the economic explanation given by [9] , panic buying can be interpreted as the distortion of demand curve. When supply interruption happens, demanders are expected to value the supply unusually high and get less elastic to price, hence the demanders may suffer greater surplus loss. For the possibility of panic buying, assumption 7 is arranged.
Assumption 7: The announced supply interruption distorts the price elasticity of the aggregate demand. The degree of the distortion is decreasing on the size of the strategic inventory held at the immediate convenience of the consumers.
The Proposal
Suppose that the oil supply interruption is expected to take pace at time and policies of GSPR are required to make at time 0. Currently, no GSPR drawing right has been pre allocated and the GSPR oil is sold to the market at t , the instant market price of time , which means at time 0, is regarded as 1. In other words, the current government is typically the kind of 0 . Our proposal is requiring the government to transform from to .
More specifically, consumers and 1 at time 0 are proposed to sign a contract which specifies: at time consumer i is allowed to buy i amount of GSPR stock at the price 0 , where 0 is the market price at the contracting time point, provided that at time 0 consumer i pays a fair part of the total GSPR cost. To differentiate the GSPR under 1 from the normal commercial oil stocks, we emphasize that the drawing rights also can only be executed at the government announced oil supply interruption.
The Proof of the Efficiency Improvement
Suppose at supply interruption, the oil supply is suddenly reduced to ' from the normal level , and the size of the GSPR is S S M .We can do a geometric analysis and see there is a potential improvement between the ex ante and the ex post situations. In Figure 1 , the abscissa stands for the amount of oil the consumers buy and the ordinate stand for the oil price; marks point , marks point
In ex ante situation, the demanders have a total quantity M of GSPR drawing rights in hands and they can use it once the government declares a severe oil supply interruption. In this situation, the aggregate inverse demand function is distorted to normal state the inverse demand function is (or D in Figure 1 ) and the consumers only need to pay the average price for the same amount of oil. Thus, the consumers' surplus loss of is the size of trapezoid hbcl plus the size of curved triangle bcd, or .
In ex post situation, the demanders have little immediate strategic stockpile. In this situation, a round of chaotic panic buying would happen, and the aggregate inverse demand function would be distorted to   
The Proof of the Incentive Improvement
The General Proof
By incentive improvement we meant that under the proposed mechanism, consumers will enable the government to build a lager GSPR by contributing more. Under 1 , there exists one and only one so that
, all consumers will pay less for GSPR as public good for is definitely less than . Therefore, the aggregate marginal utility curve under 1 intersects the marginal cost curve to the right (on the vertical line . Thus, the incentive improvement has easily been proved. Figure 2 , it can also be easily inferred that the significance of the incentive improvement depends on the scale of : the smaller the the larger the 1 k k M , which means if the consumers value GSPR drawing rights more, the incentive improvement would be more significant.
An Example
In order to deepen the understanding of the incentive improvement, we proceed with a simple numerical example.
Suppose     
